What Was Distinctive about Katyn: The Massacres in Context by Kramer, Mark
Case Western Reserve Journal of
International Law
Volume 44 | Issue 3
2012
What Was Distinctive about Katyn: The Massacres
in Context
Mark Kramer
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law by an authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve
University School of Law Scholarly Commons.
Recommended Citation
Mark Kramer, What Was Distinctive about Katyn: The Massacres in Context, 44 Case W. Res. J. Int'l L. 569 (2012)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol44/iss3/21
File: Kramer 2 Created on: 8/8/2012 3:23:00 PM Last Printed: 9/1/2012 4:27:00 PM 
569 
WHAT WAS DISTINCTIVE ABOUT KATYN?:                                                     
THE MASSACRES IN CONTEXT 
Mark Kramer 
I. INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 569 
II. UNTANGLING THE COVER-UP .............................................................. 572 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL JUSTICE ......................................... 574 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Katyn massacres must be understood in their proper historical 
context: the context not only of Soviet domestic politics, but also of Soviet 
occupation policy in the swaths of Eastern Europe that fell under Soviet 
military rule from September 1939 to June 1941.1 
In the USSR in the 1930s, mass killing had become a way of life 
under Joseph Stalin.2 In the brutal de-kulakization and forced                  
collectivization campaigns from 1929 to 1934, millions of peasants were 
killed, and millions more starved to death in famines that were the direct 
result of Stalin’s policies.3 
During the mass terror in the Soviet Union in the latter half of the 
1930s, the Soviet NKVD security apparatus became proficient in shooting 
vast numbers of people as rapidly as possible. In just sixteen months, from 
August 1937 through November 1938, the NKVD shot to death some 
800,000 people in the USSR, most of whom were not Communists.4 This 
rate of mass killing in peacetime, with more than 50,000 people shot to 
  
  Mark Kramer is Director of the Cold War Studies Program and a Senior Fellow of the 
Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Harvard University. 
 1 For a superb overview of Soviet occupation policy, see JAN T. GROSS, REVOLUTION 
FROM ABROAD: THE SOVIET CONQUEST OF WESTERN UKRAINE AND WESTERN BELORUSSIA 
(expanded ed. 2002).  
 2 Nicolas Werth, A State Against its People: Violence, Repression, and Terror in the 
Soviet Union, in THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM 33–268 (Mark Kramer ed., Jonathan 
Murphy & Mark Kramer trans., 1999). 
 3 See generally NORMAN M. NAIMARK, STALIN’S GENOCIDES (2010). 
 4 NICOLAS WERTH, LA TERREUR ET LE DESARROI: STALINE ET SON SYSTEME 265–99 (2007). 
See generally NICOLAS WERTH, L’IVROGNE ET LA MARCHANDE DE FLEURS: AUTOPSIE D’UN 
MEURTRE DE MASSE, 1937–1938 (2009); ROLF BINNER, BERND BONWETSCH & MARC JUNGE, 
MASSENMORD UND LAGERHAFT: DIE ANDERE GESCHICHTE DES GROSSEN TERRORS (2009); 
STALINISMUS IN DER SOWJETISCHEN PROVINZ 1937–1938: DIE MASSENAKTION AUFGRUND DES 
OPERARTIVEN BEFEHLS NO. 00447 (Rolf Binner, Bernd Bonwetsch & Marc Junge eds., 2010). 
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death every month—1,700 every day—is one of the most egregious cases of 
state-perpetrated murder in the long list of atrocities committed in the   
twentieth century. Among the 800,000 shot were nearly 250,000 (including 
more than 110,000 Poles) whose only “crime” was to belong to a particular 
ethnic group that had fallen into disfavor with Stalin.5 Mass deportations of 
ethnic groups in the Soviet Union, starting with some communities of ethnic 
Poles in Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine in 1932–1936,6 and then more  
sweepingly with ethnic Koreans and Finns in 1937,7 also resulted in the 
deaths of untold numbers of people. Mass terror and mass killing became 
standard operating procedures for the Stalinist regime and the NKVD 
throughout the 1930s.8 
Viewed in that context, the Katyn massacres, affecting roughly 
22,000 Polish military personnel and civilians, hardly seem especially    
significant. Millions of people in the USSR who died at Stalin’s hands,  
including millions of Russians, have never been memorialized. 
However, in the context of Soviet occupation policy in 1939–1941,9 
the Katyn massacres do stand out. When Soviet troops moved en masse into 
eastern Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Bessarabia after the signing 
of the Nazi-Soviet Pact, the occupation regimes they established were    
brutal, killing many people and deporting huge numbers of others to       
desolate prison camps in Siberia and the Arctic region.10 But even though 
Soviet forces in the occupied regions committed atrocities on a regular   
basis, they generally did not carry out systematic executions of thousands of 
people at a time. Katyn in that sense was an anomaly in Soviet occupation 
policy and was soon perceived as such by some key Soviet officials and 
their Polish Communist counterparts. 
For example, the Polish Communist military officer Zygmunt    
Berling, who had fallen into Soviet captivity in 1939 and was imprisoned in 
Starobielsk and Moscow in 1939–1940 before moving on to become a key 
  
 5 See generally L. BERIYA – I. STALINU: ‘SOGLASNO VASHEMU UKAZANIYU’ (N. F. Bugai 
ed., 1996). For a valuable 2-volume set of declassified documents on the mass executions of 
ethnic Poles in the USSR, see WIELKI TERROR: OPERACJA POLSKA 1937–1938 (Jerzy Bedna-
rek et al. eds., 2010). 
 6 See generally PO RESHENIYU PRAVITEL’STVA SOYUZA SSR: DEPORTATSIYA NARODOV – 
DOKUMENTY I MATERIALY (N. F. Bugai and A. M. Gonov, eds., 2003). 
 7 See generally P. M. POLYAN, NE PO SVOEI VOLE: ISTORIYA I GEOGRAFIYA 
PRINUDITEL’NYKH MIGRATSII V SSSR (2001). 
 8 See generally Werth, supra note 2; NAIMARK, supra note 3. 
 9 See generally N.S. Lebedeva, The Deportation of the Polish Population to the U.S.S.R., 
1939–41, in FORCED MIGRATION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1939–1950, at 28, 28 
(Alfred J. Rieber ed., 2000).  
 10 See KEITH SWORD, DEPORTATION AND EXILE: POLES IN THE SOVIET UNION, 1939–1948 
13 (1994) (indicating that the Soviet deportation plans were executed within weeks of the 
performance of the pact and subsequent invasion of Poland and the Baltic states). 
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figure in Poland’s Communist-era army, recounts an episode in his memoirs 
that sheds interesting light on how at least a few Soviet leaders soon came 
to view Katyn.11 Berling, who avoided execution himself in 1940 by    
agreeing to cooperate with the Soviet NKVD, describes a meeting he and 
two other Polish Communist officers had in Moscow in January 1941.12 
This meeting was first publicly disclosed in U.S. congressional hearings in 
the early 1950s in two different versions: one provided by Józef Czapski, a 
Polish army captain who apparently heard about the meeting from the 
Polish army commander General Władysław Anders, and the other by   
Henryk Szymanski, a U.S army colonel and military intelligence officer, 
who obtained a document about the meeting from General Anders.13 Of the 
two accounts, Czapski’s is more accurate, though the date that both he and 
Szymanski give for the meeting—the fall of 1940—is earlier than the     
January 1941 date cited in the authoritative version of Berling’s            
posthumously published memoir.14 
Berling in his memoir recounts that he and his two Polish            
colleagues were brought to speak with Lavrenty Beria, the head of the state 
security apparatus, and Vsevolod Merkulov, Beria’s deputy (who became 
head of the state security apparatus a few months later when it was         
separated from the NKVD).15 When Berling gave Beria and Merkulov a list 
of names of officers who had been imprisoned at Kozielsk and Starobielsk, 
hoping to find out whether any had been brought to Moscow, Beria told 
them “We have no such people now in the Soviet Union.”16 Merkulov    
added: “We committed a big mistake with them” (Popelniliśmy z nimi 
wielką omyłkę).17 Berling, apparently deducing what this “big mistake” was, 
did not press the matter further.18 
  
 11 1 ZYGMUNT BERLING, WSPOMNIENIA [MEMORIES] 33 (1991); SWORD, supra note 10, at 
4–5 (describing Berling as one of the few Polish military leaders able to evade the NKVD’s 
execution orders).  
 12 1 BERLING, supra note 11, at 33. 
 13 Investigation of the Murder of Thousands of Polish Officers in the Katyń Forest Near 
Smolensk, Russia: Hearing Before the H. Select Comm. to Conduct an Investigation of the 
Facts, Evidence, and Circumstances of the Katyń Forest Massacre, 82nd Cong. Part 1, 431–
33, 488–90, and Part 4, 1233–34 (1952) (statements of Henryk Szymanski and Józef Czap-
ski, respectively). 
 14 1 BERLING, supra note 11. 
 15 Id. 
 16 Id. 
 17 Id. 
 18 Id.  
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II. UNTANGLING THE COVER-UP 
For some forty-seven years after German forces discovered mass 
graves in Katyn Forest in 1943, the Soviet authorities stuck to the lie that 
German troops were responsible for the massacres. But we now know from 
declassified archival materials that Soviet Communist Party leaders from 
Nikita Khrushchev through Mikhail Gorbachev reviewed documents and, in 
some cases, considered whether the Soviet government should accept at 
least partial responsibility for the massacres.19 Not until April 1990,      
however, did Gorbachev (who had recently taken up the new post of Soviet 
president) finally acknowledge that Soviet NKVD forces had committed the 
murders.20 The official TASS statement, issued on April 13, 1990, stopped 
short of a fully candid disclosure insofar as it assigned blame for the      
massacres solely to Beria, Merkulov, and other senior NKVD officials, 
without any mention of Stalin and the Soviet Politburo.21 Not until October 
1992, after the Soviet Union had collapsed, did the Russian government 
under Boris Yeltsin release documents from the Russian Presidential      
Archive showing that Stalin and other Politburo members had expressly 
authorized the massacres in 1940.22 Gorbachev and earlier Soviet leaders 
had seen these documents—and therefore were aware that Stalin and his 
Communist Party comrades ordered the massacres—but had declined to 
release them.23 
Nonetheless, even though the April 1990 TASS statement      
equivocated, it was a key reversal of decades of Soviet falsification. The 
statement described the Katyn massacres as “one of the most odious crimes 
of Stalinism”24—a characterization that, in light of the long list of mass 
atrocities perpetrated by Stalin’s regime, underscores Soviet leaders’ own 
recognition that Katyn, despite accounting for only a minuscule percentage 
of the total number of Stalin’s victims, was among the worst excesses, in 
part because it was kept shrouded in lies for so long. 
If Soviet leaders themselves recognized that Katyn was in some 
way special, we can easily understand why in later years so many Poles—
  
 19 See GEORGE SANFORD, KATYN AND THE SOVIET MASSACRE OF 1940: TRUTH, JUSTICE 
AND MEMORY 194–204 (2005).  
 20 Id. at 201–03.  
 21 The TASS statement was published on the front page of Izvestiya and other Soviet 
newspapers the next day. See Zayavlenie TASS, IZVESTIYA (Moscow), Apr. 14, 1990, at 1.  
 22 KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT 255–58 (Anna M. Cienciala, Natalia S. Leb-
edeva & Wojciech Materski eds., Marian Schwartz, Anna M. Cienciala & Maia A. Kipp 
trans., 2007). The documents were published in Russian and in Polish translation shortly 
after they were released. English translations have appeared in several places, including id. at 
264–375. 
 23 SANFORD, supra note 19, at 201–04.  
 24 Id. at 199.  
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both inside and outside Poland—were intent on establishing the truth about 
Katyn. Long before any relevant Soviet archival materials became available, 
the basic truth about Katyn was known in the West. Starting in 1990, the 
release of key archival documents in Moscow confirmed what was known 
and added many crucial details, including incontrovertible evidence of   
Stalin’s personal culpability. Unfortunately, in 2004 under President      
Vladimir Putin, the official investigation of the Katyn murders that had  
begun in Moscow in 1990 was halted, and all materials connected with the 
investigation were sealed.25 As a result, researchers have been unable to 
prepare complete lists of the names of victims and complete lists of the 
names of NKVD personnel who organized and carried out the mass        
executions. 
Thus far, the only partial roster we have of the NKVD executioners 
is a list from the former Soviet state security archive of NKVD regional 
officials who were given awards by Beria for their role in “clearing out” the 
three “special camps” (Kozielsk, Starobielsk, Ostashkov) where the Polish 
prisoners were held.26 The list is very important but is incomplete and does 
not indicate which officials actually did the shooting. Other documents  
reveal the names of four state security officers—Nikolai Murashov, Pavel 
Dulemba, Timofei Kachin, and Mikhail Kozochskii—who oversaw the 
transport of Polish prisoners from Ostashkov to killing sites in                
Kalinin/Tver.27 In the early 1990s, two key participants in the massacres, 
Dmitrii Tokarev (who was head of the NKVD branch in the Kalinin/Tver 
region in 1940) and Mitrofan Syromyatnikov (who was a senior guard and 
later a lieutenant at the Kharkiv prison), gave detailed testimony that      
revealed the identities of two people—Vasilii Blokhin and Timofei 
Kuprii—who evidently were among the shooters in Kalinin/Tver and 
Kharkiv, respectively.28 Tokarev also mentioned two senior state security 
officials, Mikhail Krivenko and Nikolai Sinegubov, who he said came from 
Moscow to organize the transport of prisoners to the killing sites in        
Kalinin/Tver, where Blokhin coordinated the executions.29 In addition,   
  
 25 Janowiec and Others v. Russia, Judgment, App. Nos. 55508/07, 29520/09, ¶ 42 (Eur. 
Ct. H.R., 2012), available at http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbk 
m&action=html&highlight=29520/09&sessionid=96396662&skin=hudoc-enpdf. 
 26 See KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 271–75 (explaining and 
providing the original list of officials who were rewarded for “clearing out” the “special 
camps”).  
 27 These documents were first published in Russian and released in facsimile in the 1990s 
by the Yakovlev Foundation in Moscow, and they have since appeared in English translation 
in KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT. Id. 
 28 Id. at 127; ALLEN PAUL, KATYN: STALIN’S MASSACRE AND THE TRIUMPH OF TRUTH 110 
(2010). 
 29 KATYN: A CRIME WITHOUT PUNISHMENT, supra note 22, at 124. 
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Tokarev claimed that Andrei Rubanov, another state security officer, was 
among those who held the Polish prisoners down as they were being shot.30 
But even if Tokarev’s and Syromyatnikov’s testimony is fully reliable, it 
gives us only a few pieces of a much larger puzzle—a puzzle that can be put 
together only on the basis of NKVD operational documents that have not 
yet been released. 
III. THE IMPORTANCE OF HISTORICAL JUSTICE 
Why is it important for Poles, Russians, and others to have a full list 
not only of the names of the victims but also of the names of the             
perpetrators at all levels? Let me illustrate this by referring to Soviet      
occupation policy in another area of Eastern Europe at that time,             
specifically Latvia. Soviet forces moved into Latvia in the fall of 1939 and 
enforced a harsh occupation regime over the next year-and-a-half.31 In June 
1941, eight days before Germany’s attack on the USSR, the Soviet NKVD 
and NKGB carried out mass deportations in Latvia, Lithuania, and         
Estonia.32 Since 1991, the Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian governments 
have compiled books listing the names of all the victims of the mass      
deportations of June 13–14, 1941 as well as the victims of further mass  
deportations carried out by Soviet forces in the early postwar years.33 
Among those deported from Latvia to Gulag camps in Siberia were 
twenty-seven members of my father’s family (four close relatives and  
twenty-three more distant), who were Latvian Jews. Their names are listed 
with many thousands of others in the series of booklets titled Represēto 
Saraksts 1941–1953 (List of the Repressed, 1941–1953), put out by the 
State Archive of the Latvian Republic (Latvijas Republikas Valsts arhīvu 
ģenerāldirekcija) in the mid-1990s.34 The NKVD separated my father’s 
uncles and male cousins from his aunts and female cousins and sent all of 
them in boxcars to several prison camps in Siberia. Three of his four closest 
relatives died of malnutrition or dysentery within months of arriving at the 
Gulag sites, and only one made it back alive to Riga from the prison camps 
some sixteen years later, several years after Stalin died. Twenty-one of my 
father’s twenty-three more distant relatives also died quickly in the Gulag, 
  
 30 SANFORD, supra note 19, at 102. 
 31 EXPERIENCING TOTALITARIANISM: THE INVASION AND OCCUPATION OF LATVIA BY THE 
USSR AND NAZI GERMANY, 1939–1991, at 1 (Andrejs Plakans ed., 2007). 
 32 See Lauri Mälksoo, Soviet Genocide? Communist Mass Deportations in the Baltic 
States and International Law, 14 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 757, 757–87 (2001) (discussing the 
deportations and their legal implications). 
 33 Id. 
 34 For the published lists, see LATVIJAS REPUBLIKAS VALSTAS ARHĪVS – REPRESĒTO 
SARAKSTS: 1941–1953 [LATIVIAN REPUBLIC STATE ARCHIVES – REPRESSED PERSONS: 1941–
1953] (1995).  
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and one made it back alive in the mid-1950s. The final member of my    
father’s family, Aleah Kleimana, also died, but not in the Gulag. On the day 
of the deportations, June 14, 1941, when she was eighteen years old and 
about to start her higher education, eyewitness accounts indicate that an 
NKVD officer grabbed her and attempted to rape her. She desperately tried 
to fight him off, and he, in his fury, took his gun and beat her to death. 
After I found out about this incident in the 1990s, I attempted to 
track down the identity of the NKVD officer who assaulted and murdered 
my cousin. I did not intend to seek physical revenge against the person (who 
was undoubtedly long dead) or his descendants, but I did feel it was       
important to ensure that his name was publicly known forever along with 
the appalling crime he committed. In ordinary life we believe it is important 
to bring criminals to justice. It was too late for that with my cousin’s     
murderer, but at least I could ensure that his identity would be known and 
would be held in eternal infamy. When I went to the reading room at the 
Lubyanka headquarters of the former NKVD/KGB (now known as the  
Federal Security Service, or FSB), where Russians and others are allowed to 
request case files pertaining to relatives who were repressed during the  
Stalin years, the archivists told me that they would “never” (nikogda)     
release the names of the NKVD personnel who carried out the mass       
deportations or any information about them. When I told them that I wanted 
to track down the identity of a specific individual who had wantonly raped 
and murdered one of the deportees, they said they would offer no help and 
requested that I leave the premises.  
As I think back to my own deep anger and frustration in               
encountering the former KGB’s refusal to make any information available 
about the perpetrators of mass deportations in the Baltic countries, I can 
better understand why many Poles feel such an overriding need to establish 
a register of names of those at all levels who perpetrated the Katyn        
massacres, indicating who did what. We now know, beyond doubt, the 
names of those who gave the orders for the Katyn crime—Stalin and his top 
henchmen—and we also know the names of all of the NKVD regional   
personnel who received awards for their roles in the massacres. But we do 
not yet have contemporaneous documentation regarding the precise       
functions that these NKVD officials performed—which of them transmitted 
the orders, which of them brought in the many thousands of prisoners, and 
which of them actually did the shooting. The recollections of Tokarev and 
Syromyatnikov shed some light on the matter, but a great deal needs to be 
clarified from NKVD records that are still sealed. 
The compilation of a detailed list of NKVD officials and the      
specific tasks they carried out in the Katyn massacres will not bring any of 
the victims back to life and will not bring any of the perpetrators to justice, 
but it will help ensure that historical memory of the Katyn tragedy is    
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complete. After decades of falsification and stonewalling, it is time for the 
full truth of the matter to be revealed. 
